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Female Critics of Islamism: 
Liberal or Secular Islam?
Paul Cliteur
Abstract
The author distinguishes between two types of criticism of Islamism: ‘liberal Islam’ and ‘secular 
Islam’. The meaning and consequences of this difference in approach is analyzed with reference to 
the work of Chadortt Djavann, Irshad Manji, Mina Ahadi and Taslima Nasreen. The difference of 
approach is especially relevant in the way one looks at ‘interpretation’. This will be illustrated by 
analyzing a discussion between Tariq Ramadan and Ayaan Hirsi Ali.
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In the Western world, but also within Muslim countries, there is an intense debate about 
what could be called the compatibility of Islam (or Islamism) with liberal-democratic 
values (Mayer, 2007; King, 2009). At least since Susan Moller Okin’s influential essay, 
‘Is Multiculturalism bad for Women?’ (1999) political commentators, scholars and activ-
ists have discussed the question of whether the cultural practices of religious minorities 
in Western liberal democracies (in particular Islamic minorities) are compatible with 
emancipatory ideals like the equal treatment of men and women as enshrined in human 
rights treaties and constitutions.
Two years later 9/11 occurred and a whole new range of questions came to the fore 
with as the most prominent whether radical and violent Islamic fundamentalism poses a 
threat to international security and what can be done about this (Tibi, 2008; Phares, 2007; 
Guiora, 2009; Ellian, 2008).
Both of these discussions are related in the sense that most commentators conclude 
that religion has to be ‘reformed’ (Kamrava, 2006; Donohue and Esposito, 2007). Most 
commentators contend that Islamic fundamentalism, radical Islam, political Islam, 
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Salafism, Wahhabism, Islamism—this semantics is not limitative—poses a challenge 
that has to be met. The next question, though, is how? And subsequently: who is most 
likely to do this?
In answer to the first question (‘how do we oppose Islamic fundamentalism?’) there 
are two approaches to be distinguished. The first approach is that of what could be called 
the stimulation of ‘liberal Islam’ or ‘moderate Islam’. The advocates of ‘liberal Islam’ 
usually say that Islam has been ‘high-jacked’ by the radicals. What should be done is that 
‘the radicals’ should be exposed for what they are: inauthentic defenders of the faith 
(Abou El Fadl, 2007). The second approach I would like to qualify as ‘secular Islam’. 
Defenders of the secularist approach seem inclined to delve deeper into the religious 
roots of discrimination and violence. They appear inclined to consider Islam in the same 
way as every other religion: it has to be subjected to the constitutional principles of the 
secular state. There is religious freedom, but only insofar as this does not infringe the 
secular constitutional and democratic order (Tibi, 2009). The proposals to modify reli-
gion by the ‘secularists’ are more far-reaching and subsequently met with more hostile 
reactions, not only from orthodox religious circles but from the society at large as well.
The two epithets of ‘secular Islam’ and ‘liberal Islam’ seem to me useful to under-
stand a difference in opinion between those reflecting on how to deal with religious 
fundamentalism.
The ‘liberals’ reproach the ‘secularists’ for attacking religion too severely. The 
secularist position is de facto ‘anti-religious’, they say. Defending such an ‘anti-religious’ 
stance is also considered to be ‘counterproductive’ or ‘not helpful’. Change has to 
come ‘from within’.
The ‘secularists’ reproach the ‘liberals’ that they are too pussyfooting in criticizing 
religious dogmas, in particular the religious dogma of scriptural authority. As long as the 
dogma of scriptural authority is left intact the only way to liberalize religious traditions 
is by means of ‘interpretation’. And because holy scripture (Koran and Bible alike) does 
indeed contain moorings for violence (also religious terrorism, see on this: Selengut, 
2003; Haught, 1995) and the unequal treatment of categories of citizens now generally 
considered to be equal (men and women, homosexuals and heterosexuals), emancipation 
and an effective counterterrorist strategy will make little headway.
It is important to understand that ‘secular Islam’ and ‘liberal Islam’ stand for two 
broad designations about how to deal with Islamist fundamentalism. They are not neces-
sarily characterizations of what individual believers actually believe themselves. One can 
be an advocate of ‘liberal Islam’ without being a Muslim. This is the case with most 
Western participants on this debate. One can also be an advocate of ‘secular Islam’ with-
out being a Muslim. 
In this article I focus on Islam or Islamism. The reason for that is not that other reli-
gions have not frustrated emancipation or are purely peaceful (Rapoport, 1984, 1988). 
On the contrary, much of what we find in the Islamic tradition has counterparts in the 
Jewish and Christian tradition (Juergensmeyer, 1998). Nevertheless, the actual signifi-
cance of Islamist terrorism is undoubtedly greater than Jewish or Christian terrorism.
Finally: I will treat the subject of secular Islam and liberal Islam by also giving an 
implicit answer to the second question I have identified before: the question of who is to 
do the reforming?
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It does not seem premature to predict that women will have an important role in this 
process (Reed, 2002). While in the previous generation reforming Islam or Islamism was 
a matter for male scholars, the last decade has presented us with a whole group of female 
writers who entered upon the stage (inspired by a previous generation as we can make up 
from the work of Mernissi, 1983, 1992, and Saadawi, 2007). Within that group of female 
writers the division sketched above between ‘liberal Islam’ and ‘secular Islam’ is clearly 
noticeable. Some defend the ‘liberal’ option, others the ‘secular’ approach.
In the pages that follow I will try to do two things. First I will give an impression of 
four female reformers of Islamism from different national backgrounds: Chahdortt Dja-
vann (France), Irshad Manji (Canada), Mina Ahadi (Germany) and Taslima Nasreen 
(Bangladesh). Those reformers are, with the sole exception of Irshad Manji, from the 
‘secularist’ type. Second, I will enter into the discussion on whether ‘liberal Islam’ or 
‘secular Islam’ has the best chance of bringing about the reform that everybody hopes 
for. This second part I will illustrate by analyzing a debate in the newspapers between the 
Islam reformer Tariq Ramadan and the feminist former politician (in the Netherlands) 
and currently public intellectual Ayaan Hirsi Ali (in the USA). Ramadan is a clear repre-
sentative of the ‘liberal’ or ‘moderate’ Islam version; Hirsi Ali of the secularist approach. 
In some concluding chapters I will also try to gauge what position is most likely to have 
fortunate effects in integrating religion into the liberal-democratic order and of develop-
ing an effective counterterrorist strategy.
Djavann,  Ahadi, Manji and Nasreen
A tough stance against Islamism defines the approach of the French novelist and public 
intellectual Chahdortt Djavann (1967- ). Djavann gained notoriety as a public intel-
lectual with a pamphlet against the Islamic veil: Bas les voiles (2003) or ‘Down with 
the veil’. One year later she presented a more comprehensive vision on the tension 
between Islam and modernity: Que pense Allah de l’Europe (2004) or ‘What does 
Allah think of Europe?’ In 2007 she also presented an analysis of one of the most 
important seedbeds of Islamism: the Iranian Republic. She is also known as a novelist 
(Djavann, 2006, 2008).
As indicated, Djavann vehemently opposes the veil. There never was an innocent veil, 
she writes. The veil has always meant the submission of women to men. It symbolizes 
the non-existence of rights for women in Islamic countries, the reduction of women to a 
sexual object that may be appropriated (Djavann, 2004: 23). But is the veil not a personal 
choice, as many liberal intellectuals object? Or at least a much more ambiguous symbol 
than merely a sign of suppression? Partly, perhaps. But that should not bring us to the 
conclusion that there is nothing wrong with it. Slavery was also part of the oriental cul-
ture, but that should not bring us to a defence of this abhorrent practice. And fascism, 
anti-Semitism, racism may all be based on personal choices, but that should not make 
those choices respectable (Djavann, 2004: 25). Gradually Djavann developed a whole-
sale critique on Islamism as inimical to the central tenets of liberal democracy. The world 
of Islam does not allow philosophical pluralism (‘Le monde musulman n’admet pas la 
pluralité philosophique’), and she has high expectations from the secularist philosophers 
from the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries (2004: 80).
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 The Canadian feminist and critic of Islamism, Irshad Manji (1968- ), is certainly not 
one of those secularists Djavann mentions. On the contrary, Manji makes several critical 
remarks about those secularists. Yet, she is a comrade in arms as far as the reform of 
Islam is concerned. Manji is more in the tradition of ‘liberal Islam’ than ‘secular Islam’.
Manji was born in Uganda and published in 2004 a highly successful book, The
Trouble with Islam. It has been translated into more than 30 languages, including Arabic, 
Indonesian, Urdu, Malay and Persian. Characteristic of Manji, if compared with related 
authors presented here, is that she wants to remain within the Islamic tradition. She stipu-
lates that she herself is not an ‘infidel’, but a believer. Nevertheless, she points her arrows 
at the same sort of bigotry and suppression that Djavann and other women writers 
castigate. She asks: ‘Why are we squandering the talents of women, fully half of God’s 
creation? How can we be so sure that homosexuals deserve ostracism—or death—when 
the Koran states that everything God made is “excellent”?’ (Manji, 2003: 2).
What Manji tries to accomplish is getting Muslims away from a literal reading of the 
Koran: ‘What’s our excuse for reading the Koran literally when it’s so contradictory and 
ambiguous’?
This sentence is essential for a proper understanding of the aims of the group of thinkers 
advocating ‘liberal Islam’. They have high expectations of interpretation. Not holy texts as 
such are the problem, but our interpretation of these texts. She characterizes her own posi-
tion as ‘a Muslim Refusenik’. That does not mean that she refuses to be a Muslim, but that 
she refuses ‘to join the army of automatons in the name of Allah’ (Manji, 2003: 3).
What is necessary to accomplish this is what she, in harmony with Islamic vocabu-
lary, characterizes as the opening of ‘the gates of ijtihad’. Ijtihad is independent thought. 
Independent thought was smothered in Islamic culture. The gates of Ijtihad were closed 
in the twelfth century when the muftis were gaining the power to patrol the truth, Manji 
tells us (2003: 145). But there is a great hunger for change. Manji indicates she feels 
assured that she is ‘not the only Muslim who hungers to hear freethinkers candidly debate 
their truth and pertinence on the airwaves’ (2003: 169).
But although Manji is, in her ambition to reform Islam and criticize the conservative 
elements of the clerics, in line with her fellow female critics of Islamism, she keeps them 
at arms length as far as their secularism is concerned. She refers to Taslima Nasreen 
whose work will be discussed below, who adamantly believes that reform will emerge 
‘only when religion retreats’ (Manji, 2003: 169). Muslims need to replace religious laws 
with civil ones, completely separating mosque and state, Manji tells us, paraphrasing the 
ideas of her fellow reformer Nasreen. But Manji chooses something different. As an 
explication of her position she refers to an uneducated Afghan woman who will not be 
very responsive if you asked her whether she is in favor of human rights. If you ask that 
same woman, though, whether she believes in God, she will give an affirmative answer. 
And if you ask her: ‘Do you think that God is just and merciful?’, her answer will be 
‘yes’. So that last idea is a better mooring for the struggle against female beatings than 
the first one. Women do not necessarily have to subscribe to Nasreen’s ‘dogmatic secu-
larism’, as Manji calls it (2003: 170).
This strategy, so it seems, calls for some further explanation. What is ‘dogmatic’ about 
Nasreen’s atheism, Manji does not make sufficiently clear. Advocates of ‘moderate’ or 
‘liberal’ positions tend to portray the defenders of what I have called the ‘secularist’ 
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approach as ‘dogmatic’, but the question is: is that justified? What is ‘dogmatic’ about 
saying that you do not believe in God, for instance? Or that you do not base you morals 
on divine revelation?
But apart from that, the position defended by Manji herself seems to have some draw-
backs as well. Manji refers to the ‘uneducated Afghan woman who will not be responsive 
if you ask her whether she is in favor of human rights’ and who would be if you ask her 
‘whether God is just and merciful’.
This is a purely strategic argument. But is that strategy as good as it seems? That can 
be doubted, because once a ‘liberal’ believer has confided to an Afghan woman that he 
or she is addressed in the vocabulary of religion for pragmatic reasons only that woman 
will never believe a word of what is told to her. The problem with religious liberals advo-
cating a liberal reading of Holy Scripture for strategic reasons (or on pragmatic grounds) 
is that all their interpretations will appear immediately suspect once the reasons for their 
approach of Scripture becomes generally known (which is mostly the case with writers 
who, from the nature of their profession, seek publicity). The only consistent way to be 
a liberal believer and still honour integrity, it seems, is really believing that, for example, 
incitements to violence in Scripture do not hold and all exhortations to generosity, love 
of mankind and compassion reflect some way or another the true will of God. But who 
could believe such a thing?
Nevertheless, for all the shortcomings of her methodology, Manji’s advocacy of free 
speech, or what the French call ‘libre examen’, stands unsurpassed, and here she clearly 
belongs to the group of women critics reforming Islam. She even defends the rights of 
Oriana Fallaci (1929-2006) in her rants against Muslims (Fallaci, 2004, 2002) and 
Michel Houellebecq’s (1958- ) right to call Islam ‘the most stupid religion’ (Manji, 2003: 
182)—something most authors would hesitate to do. She is also very explicit in denounc-
ing multiculturalism with its concomitant cultural relativism. She approvingly cites the 
French author Amin Maalouf (1949- ) who wrote: ‘Traditions deserve to be respected 
only insofar as they are respectable—that is, exactly insofar as they themselves respect 
the fundamental rights of men and women’ (Manji, 2003: 199).
A third woman writer critical of Islamism is the German intellectual and social activ-
ist from Iranian descent, Mina Ahadi (1956- ). Ahadi seems more in the tradition of secu-
lar Islam than liberal Islam. She is an important figure within the Central Committee 
against stoning and a member of the German Council of Ex-Muslims. Her explicitly 
secular orientation makes her more similar to Djavann than Manji. What she has in com-
mon with both authors, though, is that she presents her critique as aimed at the empower-
ment of women. She holds the emancipation of women as the focal point of a free society. 
In particular she is interested in the plight of women who are under threat because they 
run the risk of being stoned on the basis of presumed violations of holy law.
What is implicit in Manji’s critical remarks about the followers of Said is more 
explicit in Ahadi’s work. She is critical about ‘engagierte Linke’, especially for what 
they have on their conscience with regard to tolerance of the intolerant. All kinds of 
oppression, as in the case of honour killings, are accepted by the members of the 
‘engaged left’ on considerations of political correctness (Ahadi, 2008: 8). But those 
crimes in the name of religion should no longer be excused as parts of ‘another culture’ 
that cannot be criticized, she claims (Ahadi, 2008: 21).
Cliteur	 159
She tells us that she has nothing against religion as a private conviction. The only 
limit should be that articles of belief do not violate the liberal-democratic order or human 
rights. Her problem is the actual brand of Islam. That specific form is not reformable 
(‘Ich halte den Islam in seiner heutigen Form nicht reformierbar’, [Ahadi, 2008: 9]). 
Therefore she decided to quit the fold (‘Deshalb habe ich abgeschworen, wie bis heute 
fast 200 mitstreiterinnen und Mitstreiter’, [Ahadi, 2008: 9]).
This is different from what Manji and many other critical Muslims contend. Manji 
and other liberal or moderate Muslims would undoubtedly say that with this strategy you 
give up all hope that Islam can be reformed from within. And that Islam should from 
within go through a process of Enlightenment, Ahadi herself tells us; the same process 
Christianity has gone through in the last few centuries. But if you leave Islam yourself, 
the moderate Muslim will answer Ahadi, how can you contribute to this process?
The fourth and final author I want to refer to is Taslima Nasreen (1946- ). Taslima 
Nasreen (or Nasrin) is a Bengali ex-physician, feminist and literary writer who became 
notorious for her critical stance against Islam and Islamism, although she is also critical 
of other religions, for example Hinduism. Due to persistent death threats she lived for 
many years in exile and remained in undisclosed locations in India and other countries. 
In March 2008 she planned to leave India due to health problems. She suffered from high 
blood pressure and cardiac distress. On 18 March 2008 she was treated in a cardiac clinic 
in Sweden. In February 2009 she received asylum in Paris.
Nasreen’s problems with radical religionists and the Indian and Bengali government, 
unable or not prepared to protect her effectively, started with the publication of her 
novel Lajja (Shame) in 1993. The novel, deemed to be blasphemous, was banned by the 
government of Bangladesh. Soon after, Nasreen had to leave the land and embark on a 
life in exile. Nasreen’s most important goal in her work is the fight against women’s 
oppression. She said: ‘from the dawn of civilization, humans have been guided by soci-
ety and religion. Society and religion have always been owned and directed by men in 
every age. State and society surely, but religion too, had forever dishonoured women’ 
(Nasreen, 2004: 2). Nasreen lives a very unquiet life, but she does not complain, she 
once said. She considers herself lucky that no one has, as yet, burnt her face or blinded 
her eyes with acid. She feels fortunate that no gang of men have raped her. And most of 
all: she is still alive. Nevertheless, she is hounded by extremists. Why? ‘The crime for 
which I am persecuted? I am a woman’ (Nasreen, 2004: 2). In this country, she says, 
talking about Bangladesh, ‘no amount of ability can raise women to the level of a human 
being’ (Nasreen, 2004: 2).
Nasreen also criticizes the Hudood laws. Hudood law was intended to implement 
Sharia law, by enforcing punishments that are mentioned in the Koran and the Sunnah in 
relation to among other things extramarital sex (Gozlan, 2002: 128). On 20 February 
1979, Pakistan issued the Hudood laws against theft, alcoholism, adultery, rape and per-
jury (Nasreen, 2004: 69). Punishments are extremely severe. Nasreen also reveals the 
strange laws about rape: allowing only male testimony in a rape case means shielding the 
culprit. In an ordinary rape case (not gang-rape) it is unlikely that there are four men 
witnessing the scene who could later testify to what had happened (Nasreen, 2004: 70). 
‘Sacred texts, as well as society, teach a woman should not have freedom. But a woman 
is incomplete till she is free in body and mind’ (Nasreen, 2004: 94).
160  Feminist	Theology	19(2)
An Assessment of the Women Critics of Islamism
My list of female critics of Islamism (Djavann, Manji, Ahadi and Nasreen) is not meant 
to be exhaustive. There are other examples as well. One only has to think of the work of 
Seyran Ates (2006, 2007), Ayaan Hirsi Ali (2006, 2007), Necla Kelek (2005, 2007), 
Mimount Bousakla (2002), Nahed Selim (2003, 2007a, 2007b ), Nonie Darwish (2007, 
2008), Brigitte Gabriel (2008), Wafa Sultan (2009) and others to realize that with these 
four names the new movement of female critics of Islamism is far from exhausted. But 
my aim is not to be conclusive but to give an impression of a new wave of women writers 
in their struggle to liberate the Islamic tradition from some of the nasty practices and 
currents connected with it.
There is much common ground between the female critics of Islamism. They all agree 
that some elements of Islam or Islamism need to be reconsidered. There is an important 
difference, though, and this is about liberal Islam versus secular Islam. Manji is a case in 
point. What Manji distinguishes from the other commentators presented here is that she 
wants to focus on ‘radicalism’ but not on ‘religion itself’. What distinguishes the ‘moder-
ates’ or ‘liberals’ from the ‘secularists’ is not a difference in values, but in approach and 
strategy. The ‘moderates’ want to avoid criticism of religion in itself and want to focus 
on some cultural practices of the religion that is—so to speak—not the ‘essence’ or ‘core’ 
of the religion itself. The secularists on the other hand want to identify some elements of 
the religion itself and modify these.
In the following pages I want to further elaborate on this distinction and show what the 
distinction between ‘moderates’ and ‘secularists’ means for an important subject: the 
interpretation of Holy Scripture. To illustrate that difference I can best refer to a specific 
discussion that has taken place between two vocal representatives of both traditions. The 
first is a contemporary reformer of Islam, Tariq Ramadan. The second is a female critic 
standing in the tradition of Djavann, Ahadi and Nasreen: Ayaan Hirsi Ali. The discussion 
is about how to deal with religious violence against women. Can we adequately deal with 
this by giving a different ‘interpretation’ of the clauses in the holy book that seem to sanc-
tify religious violence? Or should be go further and criticize religious authority as such? 
This is the same issue we have discussed before in relation to the ideas of Irshad 
Manji. This discussion is at the heart of the controversy between liberal Islam and 
secular Islam.
Liberal Islam and Secular Islam on Interpretation
The focus of the debate between Ramadan and Hirsi Ali is on the relation between reli-
gion and violence. In the Koran (24:2) there is a passage on adultery and fornication. The 
passage runs as follows: ‘The woman and the man guilty of adultery or fornication, flog 
each of them with 100 stripes: Let no compassion move you in their case, in a matter 
prescribed by Allah, if you believe in Allah and the Last Day.’
This passage is quoted by Ayaan Hirsi Ali (1969- ), a former Dutch politician and at 
present fellow of the American Enterprise Institute, in an article on a 20 year-old woman 
from Qatif, Saudi Arabia, reported to have been abducted by several men and repeatedly 
raped. Judges found the victim to be guilty herself. Her crime is called ‘mingling’. When 
Cliteur	 161
she was abducted the woman was sitting in a car with a man not related to her by blood 
or by marriage. This is illegal in Saudi Arabia. She was sentenced to 200 lashes with a 
bamboo cane (Hirsi Ali, 2007a).
For many people this sentence will be seen as draconic, outrageous or at least unjust. 
Why is the woman sentenced in this harsh way? Why is she punished at all? Because the 
Saudi law prescribes this sentence for this specific offence, could be the answer. But why 
is the Saudi law so cruel in this matter? Judging from the fact that Hirsi Ali starts her 
article with a specific passage from the Koran her stance does not leave much room to 
speculate: she thinks that the passage in the Koran has something to do with the way 
people think, behave and in this case judge (or sentence) in Saudi Arabia. What Hirsi Ali 
wants with her article, obviously, is to make people aware of the cruel passages in the 
holy book. She also argues that those passages inhibit the moral evolution of the people 
living under the guidance of the holy book. But she not only criticizes the book, the 
judges and the Saudi penal system but also, as appears from her article, the so-called 
‘moderate’ adherents of the religion. She criticizes them for two reasons.
The first is that the ‘moderates’ do not speak out clearly against those atrocious acts. 
The second reason for criticizing the ‘moderates’ is because they obfuscate the relation 
between the passage of the holy book and the social practice that is—according to Hirsi 
Ali—based on that book or at least influenced by that book. As one of the most vocal 
spokesmen for that moderate approach she refers to the well-known Muslim scholar 
Tariq Ramadan (1962- ).1
Ten days later Ramadan answered her indictment in a rejoinder quoting the same pas-
sage from the Koran as Hirsi Ali had done. In his reply Ramadan gave a defence of his 
position that seems characteristic of a widely dispersed attitude towards religious criti-
cism among contemporary intellectuals, even those critics who are willing to advocate 
reform within the Islamic tradition. Ramadan’s answer seems to be illustrative of what 
we could call the ‘moderate’ approach of religious criticism. That ‘moderate’ approach 
does not criticize the text directly, but only the ‘interpretation’ of the text. Here we have 
an important difference with the secularist approach. Let us hear what Ramadan has to 
say. He writes:
What kind of message does she [Hirsi Ali] exactly want to convey by quoting a verse referring 
to corporal punishment? That Islam, per se, is advocating violence? That violent Muslims or the 
so-called Islamic governments acting undemocratically are in fact genuinely implementing 
the Islamic message? Through her text, the message becomes clear: Islam is an archaic religion, 
the Koran is a violent text and the only way to reform Islam is simply to “deislamisize” the 
Muslims (Ramadan, 2007).
1 Ramadan is often criticized for an alleged double agenda. I will not enter into this subject and 
only comment on what he writes in response to Hirsi Ali in the newspaper article indicated 
before. See on the discussion on Ramadan in general:  Fourest C (2004) Frère Tariq. Discours, 
stratégie et méthode de Tariq Ramadan Grasset. Paris: Bernard Grasset ;  Landau P (2005) Le 
Sabre et le Coran. Tariq Ramadan et les frères musulmans à la conquête de l’Europe. Paris: 
Éditions du Rocher; Berman P (2007) Who is afraid of Tariq Ramadan? The islamist, the 
journalist, and the defense of liberalism. The New Republic, 4  June: 37-62.
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Ramadan advances some implications of the reasoning of Hirsi Ali that seem to him 
simply unacceptable or unwelcome. Let us analyze the most important aspects of 
Ramadan’s answer.
First, Ramadan asks ‘what kind of message does she exactly want to convey by quot-
ing a verse referring to corporal punishment?’ But the message conveyed by Hirsi Ali is 
not too difficult to understand, so it seems: passages in the Holy Book do actually influ-
ence behavior. That is what she wants to say. This is also the message of critics of 
Islamism with a similar approach: Djavann, Ahadi and Nasreen. To determine whether 
they are right we have to pose the question whether Sura 24:2 is indeed the basis of or, to 
put it more cautiously, influential on the Saudi penal system and the harsh punishments 
it inflicts on Saudi women. What (if any) is the direct or indirect impact of Sura 24:2 on 
the ideas of the Saudi judges and the Saudi law?
Ramadan does not address that question unswervingly. Instead he directs the attention 
away from Islam. In an elaboration of the passage quoted before he writes:
Would it not be possible to quote here tens of passages from the Bhagavad Gita, the Torah, 
the Gospels and the Epistles that are violent without reaching the conclusion that Hinduism, 
Judaism or Christianity are violent per se? Is it difficult to understand that this is a question 
of interpretation and that to condemn in such a way a religion, by its very essence, is not 
only unjust but deeply counterproductive? It does not help the inner dynamic of reforms 
(Ramadan, 2007).
This answer is illuminating because it illustrates the basic difference in the approach of 
those who favour ‘liberal Islam’ or ‘moderate Islam’ on the one hand and those who 
advocate ‘secular Islam’ on the other. His first explicit contention in this second quote 
from Ramadan’s article is that there are violent passages from the holy books of other 
great religions. That necessitates two questions. First: is this true? Second: is it relevant?
Would it be possible, for instance, to quote from the Gospels, as Ramadan explicitly 
contends, passages from which it appears that Jesus Christ is in favour of the same harsh 
punishments as indicated in Sura 24:2? On this point Ramadan does not provide exam-
ples but supposes this to be the case. One may doubt whether it is possible to provide 
examples from the Gospels that are similar to the one quoted from the Koran, but that it 
would be able to quote those passages from the Old Testament seems clear (see for e.g. 
Deut. 13.5-6). The most important question, however, is something else. It has to do with 
the relevance of his response. The main problem, so it seems, is that it is no answer to 
Hirsi Ali’s indictment. The fact that other religions prescribe violent behaviour as well as 
Islam does, does not exonerate Islam. What Ramadan seems to do is accuse Hirsi Ali of 
selective indignation. His message seems to be: ‘because other religions are violent you 
have to castigate them all before you have the moral right to criticize one specific reli-
gion, i.e. Islam.’ But that seems not a strong defence for the simple reason that the direct 
occasion for Hirsi Ali’s criticism was the Saudi woman convicted of ‘mingling’. If the 
whole discussion could have been ignited on occasion of an imminent flogging of a Jew-
ish woman in Israel convicted in a Jewish Court, the whole discussion should focus on 
the Old Testament and whether the Israeli judges could have been influenced by passages 
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from Deuteronomy or other notorious examples of violent texts in the Old Testament. 
But this was not the case.
In other words: it is not the violent passages from the holy book that are the focus of 
our attention, it is the combination of scriptural authority with contemporary social prac-
tices. Scriptural passages advocating violence that are not heeded by believers in the 
twenty-first century because they are considered to be some kind of poetry give us less 
cause to worry.
Religion ‘per se’
There is a second point that Ramadan addresses. This second point is only made in pass-
ing in the first quote from his article, more by way of suggestion than explicit argumenta-
tion. He seems to insinuate that although it may be possible to quote violent passages 
from holy books and holy traditions, it is not justified to conclude from this that those 
religions are violent ‘per se’. This may seem a trifling distinction but in fact it is very 
important indeed. Ramadan suggests that we should distinguish between, first, the actual 
consequences that are drawn from a religion and some passages in the holy book and, 
second, ‘religion per se’. And ‘religion per se’ in his worldview seems to be something 
that remains untouched by the social manifestations of that religion and the possibly 
violent passages in the text of revelation. I therefore propose to dub this the ‘metaphysi-
cal conception of religion’ in contrast to what one could label the ‘empirical conception 
of religion’. What worries Ramadan is that Hirsi Ali apparently refuses to subscribe to 
the metaphysical notion of religion, to the idea that there is a religion ‘per se’. Hirsi Ali 
is indicted of playing a false game: she wants to judge and possibly reject a religion on 
the basis of its unwelcome manifestations, the contents of its holy books, the attitude of 
its believers, whereas according to Ramadan we have to judge a religion on what might 
be called its ‘per se-character’ or its metaphysical dimension.
In introducing this pristine and metaphysical ‘per se’-notion of religion, always 
unaffected by the vicissitudes of religion in this empirical world, Ramadan and other 
‘moderate’ or ‘liberal’ believers make some metaphysical claims that need to be studied 
and analyzed thoroughly. But so long as this has not been done, it seems justified not to 
adopt that notion. The empiricist of religion will say: there is no ‘religion per se’ apart 
from the manifestations of that religion. A religion is what is written about that religion 
in the book and what the believers act upon. There is no ‘religion per se’ distinct from 
the texts of the holy book and the behavior of its acolytes. The metaphysical approach 
of religion has to be rejected. The group of critics that I have identified as the advocates 
of ‘secular Islam’ are predominantly ‘empirical’ in their approach. Advocates of ‘mod-
erate’ or ‘liberal’ positions, on the other hand, tend to think that ‘religion in itself’ or 
‘religion per se’ (as Ramadan calls it) is necessarily good. This is a kind of metaphysical 
conviction, and judged on the basis of the tenaciousness of their adherents almost ‘reli-
gious’ in nature, so it seems to me (although it is never presented as such and also not 
recognized as such).
Perhaps these distinctions will strike the reader as overly subtle, ‘scholastic’ or what-
ever you may want to call them. The fact that I have to introduce them, though, is because 
the ‘per se’-notion of religion is enormously influential. As a matter of fact, these distinctions 
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are not specifically mine. They are made and held by writers like Ramadan himself, 
although unconsciously and without an idea of their dubious character. That there is a 
‘religion per se’ apart from the social manifestations of a religion is presupposed by 
many people active in this debate.
Once we have adopted the idea that religion is from the nature of the concept some-
thing good, and evil only comes into this world by means of the wrong interpretations, 
we only have to ‘reinterpret’ religious traditions to get the result we desire. This presup-
poses, of course, that interpretation can perform this ‘trick’.
As we have seen before, Irshad Manji is very sanguine about this and the same is true 
of Tariq Ramadan. They seem both to be under the spell of the postmodern conviction 
that Scripture has no authority over us in the sense that we are not forced to a certain 
interpretation on behalf of the content of the text. In the Western world under the aegis 
of postmodernism we are almost all ‘textualist relativists’ in the sense that we think that 
we can interpret texts any way we like. This textual relativism is intimately related to a 
more general form of relativism (see, Scruton, 2007: 75) made popular by intellectuals 
such as Michel Foucault (1926-1984) and among earlier thinkers like Friedrich Nietzsche 
(1844-1900). That Ramadan also writes under the spell of this typically postmodern 
conviction is clear from the rhetorical question following on the introduction of his ‘per 
se’-notion of religion. ‘Is it difficult to understand’, he asks in a rhetorical way in the first 
passage I quoted from him with regard to the matter of the violent character of religion, 
‘that this is a question of interpretation (…)’?
At the end of the nineteenth century Nietzsche criticized positivism. The reason was 
that there are no ‘facts’, as positivists supposed, only ‘interpretations’ (‘Gegen den Posi-
tivismus, welcher bei den Phänomenen stehn bleibt “es gibt nur Tatsachen”, würde ich 
sagen: nein, gerade Tatsachen gibt es nicht, nur Interpretationen’; Nietzsche, 1969: 495).
It may safely be said that these words have had a disastrous influence: especially 
because Nietzsche added that we do not even have to try to establish facts (‘vielleicht ist 
es Unsinn, so etwas zu wollen’; Nietzsche, 1969: 495). It led people to believe that words 
can mean anything we want them to mean.
Can Interpretation Mitigate All Immoral Passages in Scripture?
The point that Ramadan makes with regard to interpretation is also made for translation. 
Anyone who has discussed scriptural authority (with believers and unbelievers alike) 
knows that many of them, if confronted with violent texts from their revelatory sources, 
react with the contention that the violent character of the text is only superficially there. 
That has to do with the ‘translation’ of the text. Usually that remark is followed by the 
good advice of the believer to look for a more reliable translation. And, of course, trans-
lations matter. The text that Hirsi Ali and Ramadan refer to in their exchange of views 
can be translated in different ways. This notorious Sura 24:2 is translated, for instance, 
by NJ Dawood as follows:
The adulterer and the adulteress shall each be given a hundred lashes. Let no pity for them 
cause you to disobey God, if you truly believe in God and the Last Day; and let their punish-
ment be witnessed by a number of believers (The Koran, tr. Dawood: 246).
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This translation is slightly different from the one quoted by Hirsi Ali. But does that 
help the apologists of religion? The answer is clearly negative. The differences 
between the translation of Dawood and the one used by Hirsi Ali and Ramadan 
are marginal, as we can see, and that may be expected when we remember that many 
scholars have carefully thought about those translations. So what could help the apol-
ogist of religion with regard to Sura 24:2 is not ‘translation’, it has to be ‘interpreta-
tion’. And it is from ‘interpretation’ that Ramadan has high expectations, judging 
from his rhetorical exclamation: ‘Is it difficult to understand that this is a question of 
interpretation (…)?’
But can ‘interpretation’ do what Ramadan supposes it can do? Even a provisional 
glance over the text makes that improbable. Nevertheless, let us start with the most promi-
sing element: an interpretation of ‘adulterer’ or ‘adulteress’. Why is the Saudi woman 
characterized as an ‘adulteress’? The only thing she has done is ‘mingling’: sitting in a car 
with someone who is not her husband or her direct family. Is that adultery?
According to the Concise Oxford Dictionary adultery means: ‘Voluntary sexual inter-
course of married person other than with spouse’. Because in this case there is no men-
tion of sexual intercourse, there is no adultery, so it seems. So the Saudi judges gave the 
wrong interpretation to Sura 24:2, the ‘moderate’ could answer. Would that help us out 
of this quandary?
Not quite. First, we have to remember that what we have done with the passage in 
Sura 24:2, is force our contemporary ideas on adultery onto a completely different situa-
tion. The Concise Oxford Dictionary simply follows contemporary semantic meaning. 
‘Adultery’, according to an ordinary dictionary, is what most people of the language-
community nowadays mean when they use the word. But that is likely to be different 
from what people mean by ‘adultery’ in Saudi Arabia. It is also very different from what 
people meant in the time and the culture which established the text of the Koran. So an 
‘interpretation’ of what the word ‘adultery’ means in the Koran, according to the modern-
ist strategy, is more similar to a revision of the Koran than an ‘interpretation’.
Nevertheless, if we follow the somewhat dubious approach of reading contemporary 
meanings into ancient texts there is some hope for modern ‘minglers’. I underscore 
‘some’, in contradistinction to ‘much’. Because there is not much fantasy needed to 
change the situation a little to see what I mean. Suppose the Saudi woman did indeed 
have sexual intercourse with the man in the car: in that case the punishment as described 
in Sura 24:2 had to be executed. Would that make our opposition to the text less urgent? 
The answer is clear: even in the case of actual sexual intercourse we are not in favour of 
one hundred lashes. So the problem is not the ‘interpretation’ of this text. The problem is 
the text itself.
Moderates are inclined to deny this. For them, as for Ramadan, the problems that arise 
are always perceived as problems concerning the ‘interpretation’. Therefore they never 
do what should be done to remedy our problems: demystifying the idea of scriptural 
authority itself. The problem is not that people give a conservative interpretation to a 
religion that is ‘per se’ pristine and incorruptible, but that people think that they can defer 
their modern conscience to ancient texts. We may also put it thus. The problem is (a) the 
content of the text itself and (b) the attitude of the people who think that they should 
follow ancient texts.
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